We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with an imperfectly competitive bank-loans market and collateral constraints that tie investors'credit capacity to the value of their real estate holdings. Banks set optimal lending rates taking into account the e¤ects of their price policies on their market share and on the volume of funds demanded by each customer. Lending margins have a signi…cant e¤ect on aggregate variables. Over the long run, fostering banking competition increases total consumption and output by triggering a reallocation of available collateral towards investors. However, as regards the short-run dynamics, most macroeconomic variables, including output, credit and housing prices, are more responsive on impact to exogenous shocks in an environment of highly competitive banks. The level of banking competition, through its e¤ects on endogenous lending margins, also a¤ects the degree of persistency of these variables. Speci…cally, stronger banking competition implies higher (lower) persistency after a monetary (credit-crunch) shock.
Introduction
The role of …nancial intermediaries in the monetary transmission mechanism has been largely neglected in the study of macroeconomic ‡uctuations. Most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) that are used to conduct monetary policy analyses incorporate a frictionless …nancial sector. One key implication of this assumption is that the interest rate set by the central bank coincides with the rate that a¤ects agents' lending and borrowing decisions. However, interest rate spreads are neither zero nor constant in real economies. In fact, di¤erentials between lending and borrowing rates are non-negligible and tend to vary signi…cantly over the cycle, specially at times of …nancial stress. Furthermore, to the extent that such di¤erentials respond themselves to changes in the monetary policy rate, amplifying or dampening their e¤ects, it becomes clear that a solid framework for monetary policy analysis must consider the optimal pricing rules followed by …nancial intermediaries.
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999; BGG, henceforth) provide a comprehensive framework that links …nancial imperfections, interest rate spreads and monetary policy that builds upon the …nancial accelerator model of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) . That theory contends that a positive spread, which they call external …nance premium, is a natural outcome in an environment featuring principal-agent con ‡icts between borrowers and lenders. Such external premium depends inversely on the strength of the borrower's …nancial position, understood in terms of factors akin to the borrowers capacity to o¤er collateral (net worth, cash ‡ows,...). BGG show that under reasonable parameterizations of a DSGE model, this …nancial friction may signi…cantly amplify the e¤ects of real and monetary shocks to the economy.
The framework we develop in this paper shares some features with BGG, chief among them is the role played by the ability of borrowers to supply collateral, yet we start from di¤erent grounds. We place imperfect competition among banks in the market for loans 1 at the center of the analysis of endogenous interest rate spreads, which we henceforth refer to as lending margins. We think of this departure from the standard Walrasian model of non-intermmediated credit market as a natural route to explore endogenous interest rates spreads. In so doing, we see the mechanism studied here as an alternative to the one emphasized by BGG. Clearly, in reality, both underlying frictions, imperfect competition among banks and asymmetric information and agency costs in lending relationships, are likely to coexist. In short, the central question we pose in this paper is the following:
How does the degree of banking competition shapes the response of the economy to di¤erent shocks?
To answer the previous question we develop a general equilibrium version of the spatial monopolistic competition model of Salop (1979) in which the borrowers' demand for external funding is modelled explicitly as the outcome of an intertemporal problem of utility maximization. 1 Overall, the modelling strategy in this paper can be summarized as follows. We pose a banking structure that is compatible with banks charging a positive lending margin and study the determinants of the degree of elasticity of the demand for loans faced by banks and, hence, the behavior of margins. The merit of using a general equilibrium model is that it allows us to pose the reverse question, i.e. how lending margins, in turn, a¤ect aggregate prices and allocations.
As the source of monopolistic power we assume that borrowers su¤er a utility cost when traveling to a bank. 2 Given this cost, borrowers optimally choose period by period their lending bank to maximize the discounted present value of their lifetime utility.
Banks set pro…t-maximizing lending rates taking into account that a higher lending rate 1 The Salop model of monopolistic competition has been extensively used in the literature on banking industrial organization. In this context, this model has been used including, among others, by Chiappori et al. (1995) , Freixas and Rochet (1997) , Dell'Ariccia (2001) and Repullo (2004) . 2 Of course, this utility cost is a pragmatic modelling device aimed at capturing the sources of monopolistic power by banks over and above those strictly related to literal transportation cost. But even the literal interpretation of geographical distance between lenders and borrowers as an explanatory variable for pricing and availability of credit has received some attention in the empirical literature (see e.g. Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Degryse and Ongena (2005) ). Indeed, Petersen and Rajan (1995) use borrower-bank distance as a proxy for monopolistic banking power.
raises unit margins at the cost of reducing the individual demand for funds (intensive margin) and its market share (extensive margin). This modelling choice delivers a good compromise between simplicity and economic content. On one end, the model is su¢ -ciently simple so as to deliver closed-form solutions for the equilibrium lending margins while, on the other, it is rich enough to accommodate a number of complexities that arise from the funding demand side. As regards the latter, we consider an economy with a real estate asset (housing, for short) and endogenous collateral constraints of the kind analyzed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) that link the credit capacity of borrowers to the value of their real estate holdings, in the spirit of Iacoviello (2005) . Beside collateral constraints, the economy is subject to two standard nominal frictions: nominal (non-indexed) debt and goods-price rigidity. Asset prices (interest rates and the price of housing) are ‡exible and the total stock of housing is …xed.
In the equilibria we analyze here, (patient) households provide deposits to the banks that use them to make loans to (impatient) entrepreneurs who …nd it optimal to exhaust their collateral constraints. 3 Hence, it follows that the demand for funds faced by banks is related not only to the interest rate on loans but also to the expected rate of growth of housing prices and to the tightness of the borrowing constraints, as both a¤ect also the amount of collateral pledged by debtors. Both housing price in ‡ation and maximum leverage ratios are major determinants of the elasticity of the demand for funds at the individual level with respect to the loans interest rate and, thus, of the lending margins.
In particular, such elasticity increases whenever housing prices are expected to rise and when borrowing constraints are loose, for in either case a small change in the lending rate triggers a large increase in the amount of collateral pledged by borrowers, thus, raising their demand for funds and inducing lower lending margins. The model also produces a positive relationship between the banks marginal cost, which corresponds to the monetary policy rate, and the lending margin. Thus, the model features a monetary policy accelerator, since a shock to the policy rate translates into a more than proportional change in the lending rate.
As regards the extensive margin, we …nd that stronger banking competition, say, due to an increase in the number of banks or a fall in transportation costs, goes hand in hand with lower margins. In addition to this intuitive result, we show that the previous determinants of the elasticity of the intensive margin (i.e. housing price in ‡ation, leverage and cost of funds faced by banks) play a similar role with respect to the extensive margin.
For instance, when housing price in ‡ation is expected to be high, a marginal increase in the lending rate by a given bank causes a large out ‡ow of borrowers from that bank towards its competitors. Thus, in our model rising housing prices, loose credit limits and low cost of bank liabilities which, arguably are all natural features of housing booms, tend to depress lending margins and to further impulse credit growth.
In order to analyze the macroeconomic e¤ects of imperfect banking competition we …rst study the steady state properties of the model. The main result here is that stronger competition among banks raises output over the long-run. As banks charge lower margins, the relative user cost of housing for debtors vis-à-vis savers falls, since the user cost is positively related to the lending rate for the former and to the deposits rate to the latter.
This, in turn, implies a reallocation of the available stock of housing from savers to debtors who also value houses for their services as collateral. Such reallocation of the pledgeable asset towards debtors rises overall investment, output and consumption. Thus, stronger banking competition "greases the economy's wheels"in the long run.
The e¤ects of banking competition on the economy's short-run dynamics are more complex due to the presence of several competing e¤ects. On the one hand, lower lending margins lead to higher leverage ratios which tend to exacerbate the short-run response of housing prices, consumption and output. On the other hand, low lending margins facilitate a faster recovery of the borrowers'net worth and, hence, their borrowing and production capacity in face of an adverse shock. Which of these con ‡icting forces -shortrun volatility versus persistency-dominates depends crucially on the nature of the shock at place.
For instance, in face of a contractionary monetary shock both housing prices and total output tend to exhibit a larger and more persistent fall as the banking sector becomes more competitive. Following the shock, the subsequent negative debt-de ‡ation and collateral (housing price de ‡ation) e¤ects both get ampli…ed in the presence of strong banking competition and high leverage ratios. On the other hand, as banking competition intensi…es, the positive response of lending margins becomes weaker, which tends to mitigate the adverse e¤ects on the previous variables. However, this latter e¤ect is found to be very small in the case of a monetary shock, since positive house price in ‡ation rate after the initial fall in the price level attenuates, to a large extent, the positive e¤ects of higher interest rates on the lending margin. For reasonable parameterizations of the model, the former (negative) net worth e¤ect overcomes the latter (positive) lending margin e¤ect.
As regards the magnitude of the overall net e¤ect, we …nd that the accumulated output loss following an unexpected rise in the policy rate after 40 quarters is around 27 per cent larger in an economy with a fully competitive banking sector than in our benchmark economy with steady state lending margins of 250 basis points per annum. 4 Hence, in face of monetary shocks, stronger banking competition works as a powerful ampli…cation mechanism of net worth e¤ects.
The previous conclusion, however, does not hold when we study the e¤ects of credit crunch-type shocks that reduce the degree of pledgeability of collateralizable assets. In this case, we show that stricter credit rationing leads banks to pursue aggressive margin increases which, in turn, tend to postpone the economy's recovery for a longer time.
Hence, we …nd that stronger banking competition works to reduce the total output loss over longer horizons by accelerating the recovery. Speci…cally, we …nd that the output loss after 40 quarters in the benchmark case is 28 per cent higher than the one that obtain under perfect competition in the loans market.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature on …nancial frictions and the macroeconomy. Regarding the central hypothesis of imperfect banking competition, the closest models to ours are those by Aliaga-Díaz and Olivero (2006), Mandelman (2006) and Stebunovs (2008) . In Aliaga-Díaz and Olivero market power arises from switching costs faced by costumers when trying to move from one bank to another. Mandelman models banking competition as an entry game in which potential competitors face …xed settlement costs and incumbents play strategies aimed at deterring entry. Stebunovs He …nds that stronger monopoly power in the banking industry increases the …nancial burden faced by borrowers, thus reducing the number of …rms in the market and the aggregate level of output. In these circumstances a positive technology shock has a proportionally higher e¤ect on total production than in a perfectly competitive banking environment.
Apart from di¤erences in the strategy followed to model banking competition with respect to the one pursued here, the above papers study non-monetary economies in which banking monopolistic power is the only …nancial friction. In contrast, key to the arguments developed in the present paper is the idea that investing agents also face borrowing constraints that limit their ability to obtain external …nance, linking such constraints to the value of their pledgeable assets. In fact, the relationship between the degree of banking competition and the responsiveness of the main macro aggregates in 6 our model hinges crucially on the way in which the two …nancial frictions -imperfect competition and endogenous borrowing limits-interact with each other. Importantly, the aforementioned models …nd that weaker banking competition is associated with a larger output response to productivity shocks due to countercyclical lending margins. While our model also features countercyclical lending margins, we emphasize that the main channel through which margins a¤ect our economy is related to the strength of the net worth e¤ects rather than intertemporal substitution e¤ects. 
The model
The economy consists of continuum of households with measure 1, and a continuum of entrepreneurs of mass 1 producing a homogenous consumption good, a continuum of retailers of mass 1 that di¤erentiate the output of the entrepreneurs, a …xed number n > 2 of banks and a central bank in charge of monetary policy. Households and entrepreneurs obtain utility from consumption of a composite good. Also, the ‡ow of services produced by their housing stocks delivers utility directly to households, while entrepreneurs employ housing services as a production factor. The total housing stock H, is …xed.
Households and entrepreneurs participate in the credit market either lending or borrowing funds. As in Iacoviello (2005) , we assume that the entrepreneurs are less patient so that they discount future utility more heavily than the households. This assumption implies that in the steady state equilibrium households optimally choose to lend while entrepreneurs borrow. Only bank-intermediated credit is available so that the households supply funds (henceforth, deposits) to the banking sector and the latter make loans to the entrepreneurs. We assume that competition in the loans market is imperfect so that each bank enjoys some monopolistic power whereas the market for deposits is perfectly competitive. Also, we assume a cash-less economy and abstract from any role of money in the economy beyond that of serving as numeraire.
In order to model imperfect competition in the loans market we use a version of 
Households
Let C t , H t , and L t represent, respectively, consumption, housing services and hours worked for a household who has a subjective discount factor 2 (0; 1) and seeks to maximize
subject to the sequence of budget constraints
5 The reasons for choosing Salop's approach to imperfect competition, instead of the more popular Dixit-Stiglitz di¤erentiated product framework, are twofold. First, loans are far more homogenous products than those composing the consumption basket; and second, we are interested on exploring endogenous variations of the elasticity of the demand for loans as well as lending margin ‡uctuations that are not necessarily associated to sticky rates. and the capital accumulation equation
At the beginning of period t the household receives labor income for the stock of houses owned by the household and P h t is the unit housing price in terms of consumption goods. Implicit in the layout of the problem is the assumption that the ‡ow of housing services that produce utility to the home-owner is equal to the housing stock. Houses do not depreciate while capital depreciates at a rate .
The …rst order conditions for consumption (4), labor supply (5), owner-occupied housing demand (6), deposits (7) and capital supply (9) are
where t is the Lagrange multiplier on the ‡ow of funds constraint (2) . The shadow value of installed capital, P k t ; is the familiar Tobin's Q:
We de…ne the housing user cost for a household, denoted by $ t ; as the marginal rate of substitution between consumption of goods and housing services. Combining (4) and (6), we can express the user cost as,
Thus, the user cost for a household is positively related to the current housing price P h t and negatively related to the expected resale price P h t+1 . It is also positively related to expected consumption growth, as this term captures the utility cost of an extra housing unit due to deferred consumption.
Production 2.2.1 Entrepreneurs
The representative entrepreneur produces an intermediate good in an amount Y t using the following constant returns-to-scale technology,
where A t is an exogenous productivity index, K e t is capital, L e t is labor and H e t is real estate. Entrepreneurs are assumed to be more impatient than savers, so that their subjective discount factor e satis…es e < .
As for the objective function, we assume that an entrepreneur located at point k 2 (0; 1] seeks to maximize the following utility function,
where C e t ; d k;i t and denote consumption, the distance between entrepreneur k and bank i; and the utility loss per distance unit, respectively. The entrepreneur faces the following ‡ow of funds constraint
where X t denotes the markup of …nal over intermediate goods charged by retailers. Entrepeneurs also face the following borrowing constraint,
where m t < 1. B e t is the real value of a nominal one-period bank loan taken at t; and R e t is the gross nominal interest rate on such loan, payable at the beginning of t + 1.
In words, at time t entrepeneurs can only borrow up to a fraction m t of the discounted next-period resale value of their time t stock of real estate.
The …rst order conditions of the representative entrepreneur for consumption (15) , capital demand (16), labor demand (17), debt (18) , and housing demand (19) are, 
Final goods producers
Aggregate …nal output Y f t is a composite of di¤erent varieties produced by monopolistically competitive retail …rms with elasticity of substitution in the consumers preferences ". A retail …rm producing variety j buys the output of competitive wholesale …rms and converts it into a variety Y jt that is sold in the market at a price P jt . The demand for variety j is given by
where the aggregate price is de…ned by
Prices are sticky in the retail sector. Following Calvo (1983) , each period a random fraction of …rms adjust prices. Let e P j;t be the optimal price of the representative …rm changing prices at t and 1 the probability that a …rm adjusts prices. Also we assume 13 that those …rms that do not set their prices optimally at t follow a simple indexation rule to steady-state in ‡ation of the form P j;t = P j;t 1 . The optimal price maximizes the expected present discounted value of future dividends subject to the demand function
e k j;t;t+ e k mc j;t;t+ e k Y j;t+ e k
where j;t;t+ e k , mc j;t;t+ e k ; and P j;t+ e k are the …rm's discount factor, the marginal cost and the aggregate price, respectively and e p jt = e P jt Pt
. The aggregate price level satis…es,
We assume that retail …rms are owned by savers. Then, the relevant discount rate in pricing j;t;t+ e k can be expressed as E t j;t;t+1 = s E t s t+1 = s t : Finally, since retailers do not use other inputs in production, the expected marginal cost of the optimizing …rm at t + e k equals the inverse of the markup, X t ; i.e.mc j;t;t+ e k = mc t+ e k = 1=X t+ e k : Thus, the pro…ts of the …rms in this sector are jt = 
Banks
Bank i chooses the interest rate on loans to entrepreneurs R i;e t , and the volume of deposits
and the balance-sheet identity,
t . 6 Each bank takes all prices, the interest rate R d t (which is set by the central bank), the interest charged on loans made by its competitors, and the entrepreneurs demand for funds functions as given. In order to solve for the optimal loan interest rate rule followed by bank i, it is convenient to express its total demand for loans in terms of an intensive and an extensive margin as follows,
where, b The …rst order conditions of this pro…t maximization problem can then be written in compact form as, 
Monetary policy
We assume that the central bank sets the interest rate R d t according to a Taylor rule of the form:
that represents a smoothed response of the interest rate to deviations of current in ‡ation from its steady-state target, . The term R t follows an autorregresive process,
where u R t is a white noise shock process with zero mean and and variance 2 R .
Equilibrium
Given a sequence of shocks, we de…ne a symmetric equilibrium in which all banks set the same interest rates (R 
Equilibrium lending margins
In this section we study the determinants of the equilibrium lending margin, R e t
We derive the analytical expressions for the semi-elasticities appearing in the …rst order condition of the banks'problem, (21) . In order to obtain an expression for the lending rate, we …rst obtain a closed form solution for the individual demand for funds function, (13), we obtain the following expressions for the entrepreneur's time t total consumption
and,
Then, combining (25) with the borrowing constraint (14) holding as an equality, we can write the demand for funds of an entrepreneur who travels to bank i at time t as
(Note that we are using the superscript i on R i;e t in (26) whereas we write R e t 1 in (23).
We follow this notational convention to emphasize that the entrepreneur's banking choice at t 1 is irrelevant for the current one. Furthermore, R e t 1 is taken as an element of a past symmetric equilibrium and, hence, it is common for all banks.)
From (26), we learn that the demand for funds by an entrepreneur borrowing from bank i depends positively on his net worth, N W We next focus on the extensive margin of the demand for funds faced by bank i.
We proceed by …rst identifying the entrepreneur k located between banks i and i 1 who is indi¤erent between the loan rates o¤ered by both banks (henceforth, the "pivotal entrepreneur"). We do this by equalizing the pivotal entrepreneur's total discounted utility values (i.e. the time t version of (12)) that would obtain conditional on borrowing at time t from bank i as opposed to bank i+1. To clear the desk, it is helpful to note that current consumption, C e t , according to (23) and (24), is independent of the entrepreneur's current banking choice. Also, as each borrower decides optimally his lending bank period by period and without any history-given constraint, we learn that the utility-cost terms
s for s > t, are independent of the current banking choice, as well. Hence, the pivotal entrepreneur is implicitly identi…ed through the following equality,
where C e;i s and C e;i+1 s are interpreted as the optimal level of consumption conditional on the entrepreneur having obtained a loan at time t from bank i or bank i + 1; respectively.
An important feature of this problem is that the current banking choice displays persistent e¤ects on consumption at all future dates. To see this, we combine (23) and (25) with (14) holding as an equality and express entrepreneurial net worth at t + 1 as a function of its own lagged value,
Importantly, the ratio Y t+1 = (X t+1 H e t ) is independent of the lending rate, R i;e t : This is due to the fact that the markets for capital and labor are both competitive, which together with a Cobb-Douglas technology imply that the optimal output-housing ratio can be expressed as a function of the wage and the rental price of capital. Formally, combining (11), (16) and (17), we learn that,
Hence, the only channel through which R i;e t a¤ects N W e;i t+1 is through the direct e¤ect of R i;e t on the (constrained) amount of external funding that the entrepreneur borrows at t.
The following expression extends (29) 
The intuition behind this equality is the following. By lowering its lending rate, bank i tends to attract entrepreneurs that are further away from its own position (i.e. higher 
This last expression makes clear that the extensive margin depends negatively on the number of competing banks. The second term in the right hand side of (32) re ‡ects the fact that an increase in R i;e t reduces the utility surplus that entrepreneurs obtain from borrowing from bank i as compared with borrowing from either alternative, i 1 or i + 1.
That surplus is comprised of the discounted value stream of utility gains from t + 1 on.
Also the sensitiveness of the market share to variations in the surplus falls as increases.
If the utility cost of moving to other bank increases, then the incentive to do so will be reduced. , and then imposing symmetry, we obtain the semi-elasticity of the market share,
where we have used the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium the market share of each 20 bank is simply 1=n: Equation (33), when combined with (27) , can also be expressed as
This last expression is intuitive in light of the previous discussion around its intensive margin counterpart, t . As the time t volume of collateral varies strongly with the lending rate, i.e. i t is high, so does the time t + 1 net worth and, hence, consumption at that date. In short, a large value of i t ; given everything else, implies that a small increase in bank i's lending rate causes a large out ‡ow of potential borrowers and vice versa. Furthermore, the fact that innovations in the net worth at t + 1 unchain persistent wealth e¤ects implies that a given degree of sensitiveness of the intensive margin gets ampli…ed over the extensive margin, as formally captured by the term in brackets in the right side of (34). Finally, the e¤ect of the term n= (which can be thought as of representing the "e¤ective degree of bank competition") on e e t is straightforward. High values of n= imply a low degree of local monopoly power which, in turn, translates into higher sensitivity of the market share with respect to the lending rate.
We are now in a position to obtain the following expression for the symmetric equilibrium lending margin, R e t R d t , by combining (21), (27) and (33), contrast to the BGG framework, however, the channel we study in this paper emphasizes the idea that the degree of competition among lenders shapes the function that links a borrower's capacity to pledge collateral and the incentives faced by the lender when setting its lending rate. As such, we think of the mechanism explored here as working parallel and, potentially, amplifying or mittigating the one highlighted in BGG.
Steady state analysis
In this section we examine the long-run implications of changes in the degree of banking competition. To this aim, we …rst study the determinants of the steady-state lending margins and then, with the help of some numerical exercises, we analyze how the degree of banking competition in ‡uences some variables of interest.
Steady state margin
In the steady state the households subjective discount factor determines the real interest rate paid on deposits through the Euler equation (7), such that r d = 1= ; where r
(We drop the time subscript to denote a variable in the steady state.) Then, by combining the steady state version of (7) with that of (18) Using (35), we obtain the following expression for the lending margin,
This expression re ‡ects the role of the di¤erent model components on the margin. In particular, we …nd that higher steady-state deposit rates r d , which in the current context are to be understood as a lower discount factor for savers , go hand in hand with higher margins. Stricter collateral requirements, as captured by lower m, also contribute to rise lending margins. This latter feature of the model re ‡ects the idea that collateral constraints not only limit the amount of credit but may also in ‡uence its price. Finally, as expected, the margin is positively associated with larger banking monopolistic power, as captured by low values of .
Calibration
To evaluate numerically the main properties of the model in the steady state we next calibrate its parameters to a quaterly time period. We start with the parameters governing the bank lending margins. The savers subjective discount factor , is set in our central scenario at 0:9926; which produces an annual real interest rate on deposits of 3 per cent.
We then chose a discount factor for impatient entrepreneurs e = 0:97, which is within the range of the normal bands used in the previous literature (see Iacoviello (2005) and the references therein). 8 We also set m = 0:85, which is in line with recent estimations for the U.S. 9 We normalize the number of banks at 10 and set = 11 that yields a real 
Long run e¤ects of imperfect banking competition
The panels in …gure 1 represent the steady state value of several magnitudes along different levels of the annualized lending margin measured in real terms. The latter ranges from zero, which corresponds to a perfectly competitive banking sector (i.e. = 0) to 400 basis points, which obtains by setting = 17:6: All variables are normalized to take 8 The degree of impatience implicit here is higher than the one calibrated by Krusell and Smith (1998) and Hercowitz (2006a, 2006b) , who set e = 0:985: Since in our set up there is a positive lending margin, we choose a lower e to ensure that in the vicinity of the steady state the borrowing constraint is always binding even when we consider high margins. 9 Cambell and Hercowitz (2006b) calculate that the average equity share of new home owners in the U.S. for the last decade has been around 17:5%., which is consistent with a loan-to-value ratio of 82:5%: Likewise, Iacoviello (2005) obtains an estimation of the loan-to-value for U.S. entrepreneurial debt at 89%: a value of 100 in the benchmark case described above (i.e. = 11). In order to get intuition into the mechanism behind the above result, it is helpful to examine how competition among banks a¤ects the distribution of the housing stock between households and entrepreneurs. To this aim we next analyze how the user cost for an entrepreneur relative to that of a household varies with . Using (10) and (20) 
The relative user cost of housing as expressed in (37) is an increasing function of (…gure 1.6). This is an intuitive result. As goes down, the interest rate paid by the entrepreneurs falls for any given a rate on deposits, r d . Since the latter, which is the relevant intertemporal price for the households user cost, is una¤ected by the fall in ; using housing services becomes relatively less expensive for entrepreneurs, thus raising their demand, H e (see …gure 1.5). The rise in the use of housing services in the production function (11), in turn, increases output. The latter pushes up wages and entrepreneurial net worth which trigger a rise in households and entrepreneurs consumption, respectively. Lending rates turn out to be key components of the transmission mechanism of shocks.
As discussed before, weaker competition in the banking sector raises lending rates in the steady state, reducing consumption expenditure of savers and more so that of borrowers due to a reallocation of available collateral from the latter to the former. The responses of the main aggregate variables to various shocks will not be independent to the structure of this industry either. In what follows we illustrate this by analyzing the response function of some aggregate variables after three types of AR(1)shocks: i) a monetary policy shock a¤ecting the Taylor rule (with autorregressive coe¢ cient r = 0:1), ii) a technology shock a¤ecting the productivity parameter A( A = 0:9); and iii) a credit-crunch shock de…ned as a temporary deviation of the pledgeability ratio (m t ) with respect to its steady-state value ( m = 0:95).
Monetary policy shocks and banking competition
Herein we focus on the e¤ects of an unanticipated temporary monetary shock, implemented as a positive innovation R t in the monetary policy rule (22) , that raises the nominal rate R In order to get intuition on the previous numerical …ndings, we next focus on three important channels through which monetary shocks a¤ect the variables of this economy:
sticky prices in the manufacturing sector, endogenous lending margins and net worth e¤ects.
Price rigidity. The presence of nominal rigidities has the usual e¤ect in this model.
The interest rate innovation causes an upward reaction of the real interest rate that diminishes consumption, via intertemporal substitution, and investment spending. From causal inspection of …gure 2.2, it is clear that price rigidity is unlikely to account for the sizeable di¤erences in the output response. In fact the dynamics of in ‡ation across banking structures are remarkably similar and that implies that the sacri…ce ratio, in terms of output loss relative to in ‡ation, is also signi…cantly higher in the economy with a more competitive banking industry. 
where a hatted variable denotes deviations of that variable with respect to its steady state value. r follows from the fact that stronger competition among banks drives lending rates down which raises leverage ratios. To gain some further insights into this latter mechanism, it is helpful to analyze the impact response of entrepreneurs'net worth at the time of the shock (t = 1). To this aim, we combine (14) , holding as an equality, and (23), to express the entrepreneurial net worth at t = 1 as
Log-linearizing (39) around the steady state gives the following expression for the relative deviation of net worth on impact (i.e. at t = 1),
The term, r e =(r e m) in the above expression corresponds to the steady state ratio of housing investments over net worth, i.e. P h H e =N W e ; which can also be expressed as an increasing function of the leverage ratio, B e =P h H e ; as 1= 1 B e =P h H e . Clearly, the leverage ratio is negatively related to r e and, hence, according to (36), it increases with the degree of baking competition. Higher leverage ratios, in turn, amplify the magnitude of changes in the house price, the real value of maturing debts, debt-de ‡ation and the marginal productivity of entrepreneurial real estate, all of which are negative. In this context, stronger banking competition tends to amplify the original negative e¤ect on debtors'net worth. As this happens, their ability to obtain external funding in the current period falls (see …gure 2.7) even though stronger banking competition keeps margins lower as discussed above. Then, lower access to credit unchains a negative e¤ect on debtors demand for housing that puts extra downward pressure on housing prices and, hence, on debtors net wealth, reducing their ability to obtain external funding and curtailing their demand for consumption and capital, with the latter driving down capital investment.
These net worth and collateral e¤ects, which quantitatively dominate the margin e¤ect, lie behind the positive association between high competition and larg falls in housing prices, aggregate consumption, capital investment and output. 
Technology shocks

A credit-crunch shock
We next analyze the e¤ects of an exogenous fall in the pledgeability ratio, m t , that given everything else, reduces the borrowers credit capacity, hence a credit-crunch shock. Figure   4 .1 shows the accumulated output loss over our benchmark 40-period horizon. In contrast to the previous monetary and technology shocks, now the accumulated output response is larger in the benchmark economy with imperfect banking competition, with noticeable di¤erences between both cases. In particular, the output loss in the benchmark case is 28 per cent higher than in the perfect competition case.
An obvious direct consequence from this shock is a fall in the housing price due to the tightening of the borrowing constraint (14) . This, in turn, triggers a negative e¤ect on entrepreneurs' net worth, which further depresses housing prices. Thus, on impact, this shock unchains a propagation mechanism that is, qualitatively, identical to the one discussed before in the context of a monetary shock. Yet, now the impact response of entrepreneurial consumption is almost identical in the two cases under study. This is due to the fact that the lending margin in the benchmark case now rises by a much larger amount since, according to (35), the margin is negatively related to m t . Formally, the log-linearized expression for the real margin (38), now becomes
This last equation shows that the shock to m t produces a …rst-order e¤ect on the lending margin in the benchmark case with imperfect banking competition, as illustrated in …gure 
Conclusions
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with an imperfectly competitive bankloans market and collateral constraints that tie investors'credit capacity to the value of their real estate holdings. Banks set optimal lending rates taking into account the e¤ects of their price policies on their market share and on the volume of funds demanded by each customer.
We …nd that lending margins have a signi…cant e¤ect on aggregate variables. Over the long run, fostering banking competition increases total consumption and output by triggering a reallocation of available collateral towards investors. However, the e¤ects of banking competition on the economy's response to exogenous perturbations are more complex due to the existence of two competing e¤ects. On the one hand, lower lending margins imply higher leverage ratios which tend to exacerbate the short-run response of housing prices, consumption and output, through the familiar net worth acceleration mechanism induced by endogenous borrowing constraints. On the other hand, lower lending margins promote a faster recovery of the borrowers'net worth and, hence, their borrowing and production capacity in face of an adverse shock. Which of the previous con ‡icting forces dominates depends crucially on the nature of the shock hitting the economy.
In face of a contractionary monetary shock output exhibits a larger and more persistent fall as banking competition heightens. After the shock, the negative debt-de ‡ation and collateral (housing price de ‡ation) e¤ects both get ampli…ed in the presence of low lending margins and high leverage ratios. However, as banking competition intensi…es, the positive response of lending margins following the shock becomes weaker, which mitigates the downwards response of housing prices, debt and output. This latter e¤ect, however, is found to be very small in the case of a monetary shock and insu¢ cient to compensate the previous negative net worth e¤ect.
However, the previous conclusion does not hold when we study the e¤ects of credit crunch-type shocks that reduce the degree of pledgeability of collateralizable assets. In this case, we …nd that stricter credit rationing leads banks to pursue aggressive margin increases which, in turn, tend to postpone the economy's recovery for a longer time.
Hence, we …nd that stronger banking competition works to reduce the total output loss over longer horizons by accelerating the recovery. 0  1  3  5  7  9  11  13  15  17  19  21  23  25  27  29  31  33  35  37 
